I examine the learning process that economic agents use to update their expectation of an uncertain and infrequently observed event. I use a new nation-wide panel dataset of large regional floods and flood insurance policies to show that insurance take-up spikes the year after a flood and then steadily declines to baseline. Residents in non-flooded communities in the same television media market increase take-up at one-third the rate of flooded communities. I find that insurance take-up is most consistent with a Bayesian learning model that allows for forgetting or incomplete information about past floods. JEL Classification: D03, D14, D81, Q54
Introduction
Economists have long been interested in understanding how individuals form beliefs over the likelihood of random events such as natural disasters. One reason why natural disasters have garnered attention is the finding that economic agents appear to over-react to the occurrence of a new disaster (e.g. Slovic et al. 1974; Kunreuther 1976; Kunreuther et al. 1978 ).
1 Kahneman [2011] points to the research on natural disasters as among the earliest evidence of the judgment heuristic known as availability bias.
2 Nevertheless, a large and immediate change in beliefs after a disaster could be consistent with the common Bayesian learning model (DeGroot 1970; Viscusi 1991; Davis 2004) .
Flooding is an example of a type of rare stochastic event where detailed information regarding the likelihood of the event is accessible, but personal experience is infrequent. In most communities in the US, decades of historical flood records exist. Detailed parcel-level flood maps indicating the precise location of each property vis-a-vis the flood plain are also available to residents. 3 Other settings that share similar characteristics to flooding include certain types of crime (e.g. home robberies) and health risks (e.g. work-place injuries).
This paper examines how flood risk beliefs change after floods using a new panel dataset on flooding and the purchase of flood insurance. 4 The dataset includes information on all flood insurance policies in the US for each calendar year and whether a community is hit by a Presidential Disaster Declaration (PDD) flood that year. The 18 year communitylevel flood panel includes data on approximately 27 million annual flood insurance policies, 1 This finding is sometimes described as an under-reaction in terms of preparedness and expectations before a disaster rather than an over-reaction afterwards.
2 Availability bias is described as "situations in which people assess the frequency of a class or the probability of an event by the ease with which instances or occurrences can be brought to mind" (Tversky and Kahneman 1982, pg 11) .
3 New homeowners are required by law to receive a copy of the flood map at the time the property is purchased. Also, community flood maps are required to be displayed publicly (e.g. at the Town Hall), and more recently are available online. Bin et al. [2008] show that there is a price differential between similar homes inside and outside the 100-year floodplain. Since the housing market reflects market-level knowledge of the flood map boundaries, it is likely that most potential home buyers receive this information.
4 All property owners can purchase insurance, but for the ease of exposition I refer to flood insurance policy holders as homeowners. A community is defined by the National Flood Insurance Program as a local political entity (e.g. village, town, city) . This definition is similar to a US Census Place.
11,025 county floods, and 643 distinct PDD floods. Virtually the entire country (92% of the counties in the sample) was hit by at least one of these floods.
I use the change in the number of insurance policies per capita as a measure of changing homeowner beliefs over the expectation of a future flood. A simple homeowner flood insurance model implies that the demand for flood insurance increases as the expected probability of a future flood increases. Homeowner insurance policies explicitly exempt coverage for damage due to flooding and homeowners must decide each year whether to purchase a separate flood insurance policy. Importantly, the price of flood insurance is not experience-rated. The federal government sets the rates for flood insurance and insurance is available to homeowners before and after each flood at nearly identical rates.
An assumption of this paper is that community-level flood probabilities are constant from 1958 -2007 
this is consistent with the view of the National Flood Insurance
Program which sets the insurance rates and the Army Corps of Engineers which creates the flood maps. Further, there is no evidence of annual serial correlation in PDD floods.
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I use a flexible event study framework to nonparametrically estimate the causal effect of large regional floods on insurance take-up for hit and neighboring homeowners. The identifying assumption is that, conditional on a community's geography and calendar time trends, whether or not a community is flooded in a particular year is random. I find strong evidence of an immediate rise in the fraction of homeowners covered by flood insurance in flooded communities. The effect peaks at 9% and then begins to steadily decline. After nine years the effect of a flood is no longer statistically distinguishable from zero. The same spike and decay pattern in insurance take-up repeats if a community is hit by multiple floods during the panel. Take-up is the same after high and low per capita cost floods, suggesting that homeowners do not use the new floods to learn about flood costs.
The large jump in insurance take-up implies that homeowners do not make a one time decision on whether to purchase flood insurance based, for example, on the risk-based flood 5 I test the assumption of independence in PDD floods using a Wald-Wolfowitz Runs Test (Swed and Eisenhart 1943) . Section 2 and Online Appendix Sections B.6 and C provide more details on this fixed probability assumption.
maps. The size of the jump is also striking given the long history of past floods in most communities. A new flood provides very little new statistical information given the history of past floods. The jump combined with the quick decline to baseline levels suggests that homeowners are not incorporating all available information. This could occur if current homeowners forget about past floods, or by migration if homeowners only use flood information from the years spent living in the community. In both cases, the amount of flood information is limited and the relative importance of a new flood in forming flood beliefs is large. In the years after a new flood, the effect of the recent flood on the expectations of a future flood will quickly lessen (implying a quick return to baseline) as residents begin to forget or because of the entry of new residents.
The event study framework is also used to examine whether homeowners in communities close to a flood learn about flood risks from the experience of their neighbors. The goal is to provide evidence on whether homeowners incorporate the experience of others when updating beliefs over the risk of a flood (Camerer and Ho 1999 and Chong 2003) .
I am able to separately measure how direct and indirect experience affect perceptions of a future flood and to compare the relative importance of each.
I consider two different measures for proximity to a flood: geographic distance and the sharing of TV media exposure (Snyder and Stromberg 2010). We are able to separately identify TV media market and geographic neighbor effects by taking advantage of the exogenously determined media markets and the random timing and location of the floods. We might expect homeowners in geographically neighboring communities to increase insurance if there is minor flooding outside the highly impacted areas. Also, if geographic areas share similar flood risks, then homeowners could use nearby flooding to learn about their own flood risk. I find that insurance take-up in communities not hit by a flood, but located either within or just outside a flooded county, increases by about 3% in the years after a nearby flood.
Local TV news is a potential source of general flood risk information and a means to learn about nearby floods. The content of TV news broadcasts vary by media market.
I use closed captioning information on local TV news broadcasts to show that there are three times as many flood news stories in media markets when there is a PDD flood. The number of news stories increases with the proportion of the media market that is flooded.
Insurance take-up after a flood for non-flooded communities that share a TV media market is one-third as large as in flooded communities and persists for six years. Take-up for non-flooded media neighbors increases with the proportion of the media market that is flooded. The geographic neighbor take-up effect mostly disappears after accounting for whether non-flooded homeowners are in the same media market as a flood. Take-up within a media market does not vary by distance from the flood.
There is no evidence that non-flooded homeowners distinguish between the relevancy of the new flood information from media market floods. Homeowners respond to media market floods the same regardless of whether the flooded community shares a very similar flood history. This is surprising if we believe that the difference between flooding in two communities with very similar flood histories is due to randomness and not differences in community flood risk characteristics.
In Section 5, I test how well a full information Bayesian learning model fits the observed changes in insurance take-up. I simulate changes in conditional flood probabilities under the assumption that homeowners update their beliefs using the 50-year history of PDD floods . Changes in conditional flood probabilities cannot match the pattern of insurance take-up. The event study and simulation evidence points towards a learning model that allows homeowners to weigh recent floods more heavily than earlier floods (Camerer and Ho 1999; Malmendier and Nagel 2011) . The data are also consistent with Availablity Bias, a non-learning model interpretation (Tversky and Kahneman 1982) .
There are several possible underlying learning model explanations including a mistaken understanding of the flooding process, forgetting by current residents, and migration. One challenge in distinguishing between the forgetting and migration explanations is that flood insurance data are aggregated at the community-level and I am unable to observe which policies are dropped because a homeowner moved and sold the property. Nevertheless, there is suggestive evidence for the role of migration. Insurance take-up returns to baseline levels after a flood faster in population increasing communities than in population decreasing communities. I also show that a learning model calibrated using county migration rates could match observed insurance take-up.
A number of previous studies examine the immediate change in flood expectations after a flood using stated preferences (e.g. Kunreuther 1976; IIP 1995) and land prices (e.g. Bin et al. 2008; Kousky 2010; Bin and Landry 2013) . A more recent literature uses panel datasets on flood insurance policies to evaluate factors that affect demand for insurance (Browne and Hoyt 2000; Kriesel and Landry 2004) , characteristics of policy holders (Michel-Kerjan and Kousky 2008) , and policy tenure (Michel-Kerjan et al. 2012 ). This paper differs from the previous literature in that it is the first (to my knowledge) to document the dynamic multi-year effect of new floods on insurance take-up, and to use this pattern to evaluate possible risk learning models. This paper is also the first to show how neighboring floods, including floods in the same TV media market, affect take-up.
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Studies that document spikes in revised beliefs after non-flooding environmental events include Palm [1995] (earthquakes), Davis [2004] (cancer clusters), and Deryugina [2013] (weather). Malmendier and Nagel [2011] and Davis [2004] both study learning environments similar to flooding and document the persistence of beliefs over time. Malmendier and Nagel [2011] examine how past stock market returns affect investment portfolio purchasing decisions. Davis [2004] studies how the public disclosure of new cancer cases affects beliefs over environmental cancer risk. Davis [2004] finds that the standard (full information)
Bayesian model can fit the data, while Malmendier and Nagel [2011] find support for a discounting model. This paper differs from Davis [2004] in that there are low frequency 6 I am not aware of another paper that studies how TV media affect beliefs about the environment. A related economic literature examines the effect of media coverage on voting behavior and political outcomes: e.g. Ansolabehere et al. [2006] and DellaVigna and Kaplan [2010] (television), Ferraz and Finan [2008] (radio), Snyder and Stromberg [2010] , Gentzkow et al. [2010] , and Gerber et al. [Forthcoming] (newspaper) . signals over a relatively long time horizon.
The prevailing view is that the overall level of flood insurance take-up is too low relative to the social optimum (e.g. Kunreuther 1996; Kriesel and Landry 2004; Kunreuther et al. 2009 ). The learning model interpretation-that homeowners discount past floodsunderscores this conclusion. Discounting past floods (for whatever reason) is likely to lead homeowners to underestimate their true risk and thus underinsure.
7 If homeowners are underinsured, then a temporary increase in flood insurance could be welfare improving from the perspective of the homeowner. A policy that seeks to lock in insurance purchase at the higher level immediately after a flood, for example through either multi-year or automatic renewal insurance contracts, would likely improve homeowner welfare (Jaffee et al. 2008 ).
However, this conclusion must be tempered by the fact that most homeowners are charged a price for flood insurance that is 30-40% above NFIP determined actuarial rates. Also, the finding that non-flooded homeowners increase insurance purchase by the same amount regardless of the underlying information content of the flood increases the likelihood that some homeowners may overreact and initially overinsure. 11 The exception to this rate setting process are grandfathered structures built before 1975 (or the introduction of NFIP in each community). The rates for these structures are lower and approximately equal to expected flood damage (GAO 2008) .
12 The 100 year flood plain is defined by FEMA as the area of land that will be "inundated by the flood event having a one-percent chance of being equaled or exceeded in any given year." See FEMA (2008) for more details regarding the rate setting process.
13 Homeowners receive renewal notices from the insurance company handling the policy. Flood insurance can only be purchased in communities that officially participate in the NFIP. Approximately 90% of communities participate. Homeowners living in these communities can also purchase insurance at the same rates directly from the NFIP. Online Appendix Section B.1 provides more details.
14 There are often building restrictions on new structures within the 100 year flood plain. In addition, all new structures that have a bank loan underwritten by the federal government are ostensibly required to have flood insurance. However, this law is not widely enforced (Dixon et al. 2006; FEMA (2007) . Online are compensated by the NFIP for each flood insurance policy transaction. Thus, insurance companies have an incentive to directly market flood insurance to homeowners.
One important implication of the NFIP rate setting process is that premium rates are unaffected by whether your home is flooded. The base premium rates (and adjustments) for the 10 nationally designated flood zones are set for the entire country. A second implication of the rate setting process is that the base flood rates for the various zones remain virtually unchanged in real dollars for the years included in the panel analysis. For example, during the 10 years from 1996-2005, the average annual real rate increase was 0.61% for those properties built after 1975 and 1.49% for those properties grandfathered into the program (see Appendix Table 2) .
15 Nevertheless, all econometric models in this paper will include flexible non-parametric controls for calender time. 
Presidential Disaster Declaration Floods
The Disaster Relief Act of 1950 established the Presidential Disaster Declaration (PDD)
system. The PDD system is a formalized process to request and receive federal assistance
Appendix Table 1 calculates, using GAO data, that 97% of homeowners purchase flood insurance by choice and not due to existing Mandatory Purchase Laws. 15 These 10 years are the only years for which I was able to receive a breakdown for annual premium price changes. NFIP personnel have assured me that this period is representative of the program's history.
following large natural disasters. The declaration process has several steps. The governor of a state must write an official letter to the President requesting that a PDD be declared for specific counties in the state. In the letter the governor outlines the scope of the disaster including weather and damage information collected by local agencies. The letter must specify the list of counties in the state that would be part of a PDD. Historically, three-quarters of flooding PDD requests have been granted.
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A Presidential Disaster Declaration opens the door to two major types of disaster assistance. The largest component of disaster assistance is Public Assistance. Public Assistance is available to local and state governments as well as non-profit organizations located in a PDD county. These groups can access grant money to remove debris, repair infrastructure, and to aid in reconstruction of public buildings. The damage must have been caused by the natural disaster. The second type of disaster assistance is Individual Assistance. Individual
Assistance is available to residents in PDD counties. Home and business owners can access low interest disaster loans to rebuild. Direct cash assistance is also available for temporary and emergency expenses such as interim housing. This paper uses PDD events as a data source of large regional floods. The data collected include the date of the PDD, the type of disaster, location information (county), and an estimate of disaster cost.
17 All communities participating in the NFIP that have nonmissing population data for the 1990-2007 panel are included in the event study analysis.
There are 2704 such counties (or county equivalents). This includes approximately 86% of all US counties and covers 93% of the US population.
18 Nearly every county in the sample (92%) is hit by at least one PDD flood during the 18 years from 1990-2007. The median number of PDD floods for a county is three.
16 In 1986 FEMA established criteria to use when evaluating whether to grant a request. These criteria include estimated damage costs (Downton and Pielke 2001; Sylves and Buzas 2007) .
17 The paper uses all flooding-related Disaster Declarations. PDD data were downloaded from the Public Risk Institute website. I also downloaded county flood cost data from SHELDUS but opted not to use these data. Please see the Online Appendix Section D for details on the PDD data, and a cautionary note regarding the use of the SHELDUS data.
18 The population data are from the US Census. This population calculation uses US Census 2000 data. Please refer to the Online Appendix Section D for details on the Census data. (Swed and Eisenhart 1943) . Importantly, this test does not assume that the probability of a flood in each county is the same. I fail to reject the null hypothesis of the independence of annual floods at all conventional significance levels.
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19 We are able to match 98.6% of the Public Assistance claims to a NFIP community. Please refer to the Online Appendix Section E for matching details.
20 Online Appendix Section B.6 provides a more detailed discussion of this assumption. 
Econometric Model
We use a flexible event study framework that nonparametrically estimates the causal effect that large regional floods have on the take-up of flood insurance. Equation (1) is the main estimating equation.
The unit of observation is a community calendar year. A community is defined by FEMA and roughly equal to the US Census Place definition (i.e. village, town, city, etc.).
The dependent variable in Equation (1) The estimated coefficients are interpreted as the percent change in the take-up of flood insurance in community c relative to the year before a flood.
In most of the specifications of Equation (1) I bin the W cτ by creating a single indicator variable for the end periods. The bin indicator variables serve a practical purpose. I 0.30. Online Appendix Section C provides a more detailed discussion. 22 The number of policies-in-force is an extensive margin measure of insurance demand. An alternative is to use the quantity of insurance purchased (intensive measure). Using the number of policies in force avoids several theoretical and empirical challenges that are involved with using the quantity of insurance purchased. Please see the Online Appendix Section B.5 for a discussion.
23 Occasionally a community is hit by more than one PDD flood in the same calendar year. I don't distinguish between communities hit by one or more than one PDD flood in a particular year when estimating Equation (1). The reason for this is that the flood insurance policy count data are aggregated by year.
am most interested in the years shortly before and after a flood. The event time indicator variables, W cτ , near the tails of the event study, are identified off of many fewer observations and therefore have large standard errors. Binned indicator variables pool the effect on takeup over multiple event years to increase statistical power.
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Equation (1) also includes community fixed effects (α c ), state by year fixed effects (γ st ), and a stochastic error term ( ct ). The fixed effects non-parametrically control for unobserved (and unchanging) community characteristics and state specific yearly factors.
Community geography is important in predicting the likelihood of a flood. The underlying community geography includes surface characteristics such as the percent of a community located in the flood plain, as well as location specific factors such as average rainfall.
State by year fixed effects account for state-specific yearly trends that may affect take-up such as: state-level responses to flooding, state economic conditions, and changes in NFIP institutional factors. Standard errors from the estimation of Equation (1) 26 Finally, the causal interpretation of Equation (1) comes from the assumption that whether a community is hit by a flood in a particular year is random conditional on community and state by year fixed effects.
We are also interested in estimating the take-up of flood insurance for communities not directly hit by a flood.
We estimate Equation (2) when we consider "neighboring" communities that were not directly hit by a flood. Equation (2) is identical to Equation (1), except that it also includes event time indicator variables for neighboring communities, N cτ .
We estimate Equation (1) and Equation (2) Table 6 for estimates from models that are balanced in event time. The point estimates from a panel balanced in event time are remarkably similar. I focus on the balanced calendar time panel because the sample is much larger.
28 County-level PDD flood data are available beginning in 1958. I use these earlier floods to precisely control for the lagged effect of floods that occur before 1980. The 1990-2007 panel only considers leads and lags for a flood if the PDD occurred within the time frame of the event study. There is no way to determine whether a community within a PDD county was "hit" by the county-level flood before 1990. The W cτ indicator variables all equal 0 for a community for any PDD flood outside the event study window.
29 An important definition of a flood neighbor will be whether a community is in the same television media market. Media markets are defined at the county-level by Nielson Media Research. There is no discernable trend in take-up in the years before a flood. The effect of a future flood is economically small and not statistically different from zero for all time periods before the flood. In the year of a flood there is an 8% increase in the take-up of flood insurance relative to the year before a flood. Take-up peaks at 9% the year after a flood. Take-up after the flood remains positive and statistically significant for 9 years.
Estimation Results

Communities Hit by a Flood
After 9 years, take-up is not statistically different relative to the year before a flood. 
Flood Costs
This paper assumes that homeowners use the new flood information to update their conditional yearly flood probability. It is also possible that homeowners use the new floods to update their expectations over flood damage. Figure 5 plots the take-up coefficients from the estimation of a version of Equation (1) that separately identifies floods as above or below per-capita median cost.
33 The dots (squares) plot above (below) median coefficients.
Insurance take-up is very similar after a flood regardless of whether the flood is high or low cost. There is no statistically significant difference between any of the pairs of post-flood 31 Refer to Online Appendix Section E and Tables 5 and 6 for further details regarding the 1990-2007 estimating panel. These tables include specifications that are balanced in event time (Table 6) , exclude Louisiana communities (Table 5 , Col 6), and model the dependent variable in levels (Table 5 , Col 4).
32 The point estimates are about 1-2 percentage points smaller and the duration of statistical significance is shorter when the specification does not control for the lagged effect of floods before 1980. This suggests that there is likely a downward bias in relying only on the estimation results from the 1990-2007 panel.
33 Per-capita cost is calculated over all 836 floods from 1980-2007 by dividing (a measure of) total PDD cost by the total population living in the effected counties in the year of a flood. The per-capita cost ranges from less than $1 to $12,440, with a mean of $70, and a median of $20. Costs include all Public Assistance and Individual Assistance paid out after a flood (source: Public Entity Risk Institute). Please refer to the Online Appendix Section D for a detailed data description.
coefficients. Homeowners interpret the information provided by high and low cost floods the same and do not appear to use new floods to learn about expected flood damages.
Migration
Migration is a potential explanation for the spike and dissipation of insurance after a new flood, but for migration to explain the pattern of insurance take-up two things must be true. First, there is enough population turn-over so that there is always a pool of newer residents. Second, these newer residents are unaware of the flooding history and there must be a sufficiently high cost to obtaining this information. Section 5 shows that a Bayesian learning model that meets these two criteria could explain observed insurance take-up.
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There is mixed evidence on the role migration plays in accounting for the observed pattern of insurance take-up. On one hand, insurance take-up differs between population increasing and decreasing communities from 1990-2007.
35 Figure 6 plots estimates of insurance take-up using a version of Equation (1) On the other hand, communities in high migration counties do not have a larger insurance take-up rate after a flood. We divide counties into quartiles based on the average yearly county in-migration rate from 1984-2007. 36 We run the same event study model
(Equation 1), except that we use the estimation period 1984-2007 and include a separate
34 Interestingly, it is not necessary that newer residents initially underestimate the true flood probability if these residents only consider the recent (shorter) flood history.
35 Annual community-level migration data are not available. 36 Counties in the first quartile have the lowest average annual in-migration rate, while counties in the fourth quartile have the highest annual in-migration rate. The migration data used in the event study analysis described are from the IRS county-to-county migration files. County-to-county migration files are not available for 1983 . Thus, 1984 -2007 is the longest uninterrupted panel. Please refer to the Online Appendix Section D for more details.
set of event time indicator variables for high migration and low migration counties. The coefficient point estimates for post-flood insurance take-up are larger for the low migration counties, but not statistically different than those of the high migration counties.
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There is also no county-level evidence that flooding leads to greater migration. Again, we use Equation (1) and the estimation period 1984-2007, and consider as our dependent variable both migration and log migration. This finding is consistent with another recent paper that fails to find evidence of migration from counties hit by hurricanes (Deryugina 2011 ).
Protective Measures
Community-wide flood protective measures could potentially explain the observed pattern of flood insurance take-up shown in Figures 2 and 4 . A community may initiate protective measures after being hit by a flood that reduce the likelihood of future floods. If this occurs, residents may be more inclined to self-insure in the years immediately following a flood before any community-wide structural changes are complete.
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Three pieces of evidence suggest that community-wide protective measures are not an important factor in explaining the observed pattern of insurance take-up. First, Online Appendix Figure 3 shows that the same insurance take-up spike and decay pattern repeats for sequential floods that hit the same community. Second, the vast majority of the large scale flood control projects were completed before 1980 (Graf 1999) . 39 Third, very few communities participate in a NFIP program that seeks to incentivize better community flood plain management. Among those communities that do participate, there is no evidence 37 This result is not sensitive to whether we compare the top/bottom quartiles, or above/below median. Appendix Figure 2 plots the point estimates from the above/below median migration regression. 38 We focus on community-wide protective measures because it is unlikely that individual property owners can alter their property to avoid being flooded by the type of large regional floods evaluated in the paper.
39 Graf [1999] 
Neighboring Communities
The 1980-2007 panel is used to estimate the effect of a "nearby" flood on insurance take-up.
We consider two definitions of proximity to a flood for non-flooded communities: geographic distance and media exposure. We vary the definition of a geographically neighboring com- Media Markets (DMAs). Importantly, local news programming differs by media market.
There are at least two reasons why we may expect homeowners in geographically neighboring communities to increase insurance take-up after a flood. First, there is likely to be some flooding in the region surrounding the most severely impacted flood areas. Second, if geographic areas share similar flood risks, then homeowners could use nearby flooding to learn about their own flood risk. Local TV news is a potential source of general flood risk information, but also a mechanism to learn about new nearby floods. The parallel vertical lines indicate counties that are among the five closest counties to a 40 Online Appendix Section D provides details on the Community Rating System (CRS) program, and Appendix Section E discusses event study results that control for CRS community participation.
Media Market and Geographic Neighbor Identification
41 Please refer to Online Appendix Section E and Tables 8-13 for a detailed discussion of all geographic neighbor results, and to Appendix Section D for details on the neighbor data sources. We use the spatial mismatch between the geographic proximity to a flood and the coverage area of the TV media markets to estimate whether homeowners in neighboring non-flooded communities react to a nearby flood by purchasing insurance. We separately measure the insurance take-up effect for homeowners living in communities that are close a flood, in the same TV media market as a flood, or close and in the same TV media market.
The empirical strategy used to separately identify the role of local TV news media from that of the geographic proximity is similar to Snyder and Stromberg [2010] . 43 The pre-period neighbor indicators are not statistically significant. State by year FE's flexibly control for changing calendar year factors that might be correlated with insurance take-up, but exclude cross-state identification (shown to be an important source of variation in Figure 7 ). For this reason, the regressions that examine take-up in neighboring communities (Figure 8 and Online Appendix Tables 8-13) use larger end bins to improve statistical power without changing the interpretation of the coefficients of interest.
Neighbor Event Study Results
indicators for geographic neighbors. Insurance take-up peaks at 2.5% and is statistically significant at the 5% level for the first three years after a flood. Panel B plots the coefficient estimates (triangles) from an event study that includes indicators for media market neighbors. The media neighbor point estimates for the first five years after a flood range between 2.8% and 3.6% and are statistically significant at the 1% level. These point estimates are about one-third as large as those for flooded communities (circles). In Panel C, the media take-up effect is virtually unchanged and the geographic neighbor effect mostly disappears when both sets of neighbor indicators are included in the same event study.
Panel D further explores these findings by isolating homeowner take-up in those communities that share a media market but are not geographically close to the flood (triangles), and the take-up effect in communities close to a flood but in a different media market (squares). The media coefficient estimates in Panel D are very similar to Panel C. There is no difference in take-up among non-flooded homeowners in the same media market based on geographic proximity to the flood. There is some evidence of increased take-up in geographically close communities not in the same media market. This take-up is driven exclusively by homeowners in communities just outside the PDD flooded counties.
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The results in Figure 8 do not depend on the definition of a geographic neighbor.
45 The estimates and statistical significance for the media neighbor coefficients are remarkably stable and always statistically significant at the 1% level up until the first five years after a flood. This is true regardless of whether the event study controls for geographic neighbors, or isolates media neighbors that are not also geographic neighbors. The post-flood geographic neighbor coefficients also display a similar pattern as those in Figure 8 Panel C:
small coefficient estimates and no (or only marginal) statistical significance after controlling 44 Online Appendix Table 13 Col (1) and (2) divide geographic nbr communities into those in the closest non-flooded county and those in the closest 2-5 non-flooded counties. The point estimate is 4.6% and statistically significant for both the 2nd and 3rd years after a flood for communities in the closest county. The same estimates for communities in the closest 2-5 counties are 1.0% and 1.6% and not significant. 45 Appendix Tables 8-10 show the results for the same event study specifications as in Figure 8 using the following geographic neighbor definitions: a community in either an adjacent county or the closest 1, 5, 10, or 20 (non-flooded) counties. Appendix Tables 11-13 show the results for geographic neighbor "rings" (1, 2-5, 6-10, or 11-20 counties). Appendix Section E provides a detailed discussion of these results.
for the media market. The notable exception is for the communities in the single closest geographic county just outside the worst flooded counties. Take-up in these communities is similar to that of non-flooded communities in the same media market as a PDD flood.
We also estimate whether the TV media effect is greater for non-flooded homeowners when a greater share of the media market is flooded (Snyder and Stromberg 2010). The hypothesis is that if a larger share of the media market is flooded then there is likely to be more flood information (e.g. news stories) conveyed through the local TV media. We create two new flooded media market "congruence" variables that range from zero to one based on the share of the media market counties (or population) that is flooded by a particular PDD flood.
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Panel A of Table 1 displays year of flood take-up coefficients from three separate regressions using Equation (2) Panel B calculates the implied insurance take-up at the median. The median population in a media market flooded by a PDD flood is 36%. Summing the congruence effect at the median with the media market event study coefficient yields an implied media neighbor total effect of 3.4%. This implied effect is very similar to the baseline estimate of 3.1%.
Television News Story Evidence
Local TV media markets provide variation in information about and exposure to large floods. In the five years from 2003-2007, local ABC, CBS, NBC, and FOX affiliate news stations in media markets that had at least one county included as part of a flooding PDD for the calender year had more than three times as many news stories on large floods relative to markets without a flood. There were 4.3 times as many news stories on floods where a larger share (above median) of the market population was flooded, and 2.3 times as many stories for floods where a smaller (below median) share of the population was flooded. If geographically close communities share similar flood characteristics then differences in flooding are likely due to randomness. We would expect homeowners in geographically close communities to have larger take-up rates after a flood.
Second, Figure 9 tests whether homeowners in a non-flooded community take-up insur-47 Flood-related news stories are determined by a text-based search of the transcriptions of the local news broadcasts. Online Appendix Sections D provides more details. As a robustness check I also consider whether there are fewer flood news stories when a flood occurs at the same time as other newsworthy events. Panel regression estimates suggest some crowding out of flood news when floods and important national media events occur in the same month (Appendix Section E.9 and Tables 14 and 15) .
48 This result is even more striking when using the 20 closest county geographic neighbor definition (comparing column 4 of Appendix Tables 9 and 10). Communities in the same media market that are not among the 20 closest counties are often 100's of miles from the flood, yet insurance take-up is the same.
ance after a flood at greater rates if a flooded community shares a similar flood history. I divide media market floods into two groups by asking the following question: Is the county with the most similar PDD flood history to the non-flooded homeowner's county flooded? I estimate a version of Equation (2) 
Discussion
A large and immediate change in beliefs after a disaster could be consistent with the common Bayesian learning model (Viscusi 1991) . In the "Full Information" Beta-Bernoulli Bayesian Model homeowners observe whether there is a flood in a given year and update their expectation of a future flood (DeGroot 1970; Davis 2004; Card 2010) . Each community's yearly flood draw is assumed to be independently drawn from a stationary flood distribution with parameter p. The probability of a flood in a given year, p, is assumed to be distributed Beta(α, β).
49 A homeowner's conditional expectation of their yearly flood probability p is:
where t is the number of yearly observations (time periods), S t = t s=1 y s is the number of observed floods, and α and β are fixed parameters and determine the initial belief over flooding. Equation (3) implies that as the stock of information increases, the effect of a new observation will become small (and eventually zero).
The large spike in insurance take-up after a flood combined with the relatively fast decay of this effect suggest that homeowners may not be considering all of the past flood information. There are two possibilities for why homeowners do not consider all of the past flood information: homeowners don't observe the whole history, or homeowners forget. One way to model this pattern is with a weighting parameter that discounts past information (Camerer and Ho 1999; Malmendier and Nagel 2011) . In such a model, the stock of information never becomes so large as to rule out a large jump in the conditional expectation of a future flood. While the immediate impact of new information can be large, its impact on expectations quickly lessens, implying a steeper post-flood slope.
Equation (4) is a learning model that allows homeowners to discount past floods: (0, 15] . No model simulation with an α > 10 provides a statistical fit for the observed pattern of insurance take-up. By construction, a smaller α implies a smaller β. Together, α and β close to zero imply a highly uncertain prior belief. When α and β are small, the initial beliefs are "weak" and homeowners will almost ignore their initial beliefs when updating expectations.
51 What follows is a short overview of the learning model probability simulation and insurance take-up comparison. Please refer to the Online Appendix F for a detailed discussion.
the speed of the decline back to baseline. In general, the Full Information Model predicts a smaller jump and a slower decline.
52 Among those starting value model parameterizations that provide an acceptable fit at the 5% significance level, the best fitting model for each parameterization is always one where homeowners discount older information (δ < 1). Flood probabilities for the migration-calibrated model are simulated using Equation (4) except that homeowners only consider flood information from their years of residence. 53 For example, a homeowner from a recently migrated cohort who has lived in the county for 5 years will only consider the past 5 years when updating expectations (events more than 5 years ago will have a weight of δ = 0).
54 Past floods would be less important if there were either annual correlation in floods, or a non-stationary flood probability (neither of which are true for pdd floods from . Please refer to Online Appendix Sections B.6 and C for an extended discussion.
being flooded leads homeowners to interpret the statistical information differently (e.g. Haselhuhn et al. 2012) . Second, the same homeowners could be learning and forgetting (e.g. Agarwal et al. 2008) . Third, if accessing past information involves a high cost, it could be completely rational to ignore this information (e.g. Sims 2010; Mackowiak and Wiederholt 2012) .
55 For example, in the migration-calibrated incomplete information model, floods that occur before a homeowner arrives carry so little weight in the decision-making process that they can actually be ignored. 56 While the county-level migration event study results do not support this interpretation, there is evidence that insurance take-up in communities with longer-tenured residents is more persistent than in communities with shorter-tenured residents.
Conclusion
We provide new evidence on how individuals update their beliefs over an uncertain and infrequent risk using a new panel dataset of large regional floods and the take-up of flood insurance in the US. We find that after controlling for calendar time trends and location fixed effects, the take-up of insurance is completely flat in the years before a flood, spikes immediately following a flood, and then steadily declines back to baseline. Robustness checks of the model show that changing insurance prices, changing homeowner income, potential serial correlation in floods, and different flood costs are unlikely to explain the observed pattern in insurance take-up.
We also show that the news media affects how information on environmental risks is acquired and processed by homeowners not directly impacted by a flood. Those homeowners not flooded, but in the same TV media market as a flooded community, exhibit a 55 The difference between the second and third interpretations is whether the same homeowners are both learning and forgetting (second interpretation) or there are different cohorts of homeowners that respond differently (third interpretation). One way to test the learning and forgetting interpretation would be to compare new and renewing policy holders, but unfortunately these data are not available. 56 The migration evidence is also consistent withthe 1st interpretation where what is most important is experience with a flood. spike in insurance purchases that is one-third as large as the spike in flooded communities.
Non-flooded homeowners in the same TV media market take-up insurance at the same rate regardless of how relevant the TV flood news is towards understanding their own flood risk.
The large jump in insurance take-up implies that homeowners do not make a one time decision of whether to purchase flood insurance based, for example, on FEMA maps or engineering estimates. The large jump combined with the quick decay to baseline levels can not be explained by a Bayesian model where homeowners have full information of historical flooding and weigh each past flood observation equally. Overall, a learning model that discounts past floods does a good job of describing the observed pattern of flood insurance take-up. There are several possible underlying interpretations including Availability Bias.
There is modest support for the role of migration in any learning model interpretation.
Either homeowners don't know about floods that occurred before they arrive in a community, or the experience of living through a flood leads homeowners to treat recent floods differently. Panel A columns (1)-(3) display select coefficients from estimation of Equation (2) The figure plots event time insurance take-up coefficients from estimation of Equation (1) on the 1990-2007 Panel. All estimated coefficients can be interpreted as the percent increase in flood insurance policies per capita for a hit community relative to the year before a flood (-1 on the x-axis). The end points on the graph are binned so that -11 (+11) is a bin for years -11 to -17 (+11 to +17). The vertical axis measures log per capita flood insurance take-up. The coefficient for the year before a flood is normalized to zero. The bars show the 95% confidence interval. Standard errors are clustered by state. There are 10,841 communities in the event study. A community is defined by the National Flood Insurance Program (NFIP) and corresponds to political jurisdictions: city, town, village, etc. A community is defined as hit if there is a Public Assistance damage claim submitted to the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) for damage from a Presidential Disaster Declaration flood. Log Policies Per Capita -15 -13 -11 -9 -7 -5 -3 -1 1 3 5 7 9 11 13 15 Event Time Years
Tables and Figures
The figure plots event time insurance take-up coefficients from estimation of Equation (1) on the 1980-2007 Panel. All estimated coefficients can be interpreted as the percent increase in flood insurance policies per capita for a hit community relative to the year before a flood (-1 on the x-axis). The end points on the graph are binned so that -16 (+16) is a bin for years -16 to -27 (+16 to +27). The vertical axis measures log per capita flood insurance take-up. The coefficient for the year before a flood is normalized to zero. The bars show the 95% confidence interval. Standard errors are clustered by state. There are 9,607 communities in the event study. A community is defined by the National Flood Insurance Program (NFIP) and corresponds to political jurisdictions: city, town, village, etc. A community is defined as hit if it is in a PDD flooded county. 
